post-secondary

Analysis of University of Alberta Settlement

The Association of Academic Staff: University of Alberta (AASUA) recently ratified a new settlement. This blog post provides an overview of the AASUA settlement. Overall, this settlement extends the public-sector and PSE wage pattern but with some additional monetary and language improvements.

Term and Money

This four-year deal has a term of July 1, 2020 to June 30, 2024. The cost-of-living adjustment (COLA) for all salaries and grids is as follows:

Jul 1, 2020: 0%

July 1, 2021: 0%

July 1, 2022: 0%

April 1, 2023: 1.25%

December 1, 2023: 1.5%

Additional increase December 1, 2023: 0.5% (not guaranteed)

The additional increase scheduled for December of 2023 is contingent upon the province achieving a real GDP for the 2023 calendar year that is at or above 2.7% as of February 2024. If this condition is met in February of 2024, U of A will retroactively apply an additional 0.5% COLA to December 1, 2023. If this condition is not met, then no additional increase will be forthcoming.

This means the AASUA settlement could see an (uncompounded) COLA increase of between 2.75% and 3.25% over its four-year term. Even with the addition of gain-sharing payments, this settlement will not maintain the purchasing power of AASUA salaries over time. For example, year-over-year inflation as of January 2022 was 5.1%.

The AASUA settlement matches the COLA agreed to by AUPE for its government services bargaining unit and the Mount Royal Faculty Association (MRFA) settlement from late February. This appears to be the current “secret” financial mandate issued the government.

One interesting aspect of the AASUA settlement is the introduction of a two-tier salary grid for teaching only staff on two- to six-year contracts. New hires at the Full Lecturer rank would be subject to the lower grid (a 13% reduction in maximum compensation).

Old Grid

Introducing a two-tier wage system is usually easy to do, because the people affected aren’t yet hired so can’t vote against it. However, two-tier grids can erode solidarity in the long term. This is an example of the employer using wedge tactics (i.e., targeting a small group for workers rollbacks while bribing the rest of the workers with gains) to divide union members against each other over time.

We see AU using wedge tactics in its attack on professional rights at the bargaining table. In the fall, AUFA members overwhelming rejected these sorts of wedge tactics. When members hold firm, employers usually give up on them. For example, AU’s latest without-prejudice offer did not include (1) its proposed rollbacks to professional freedom or (2) its desire for new temporary layoff language for professionals.

Extra Compensation

In addition to the COLA settlement, AASUA was able to negotiate some additional changes. Key changes that have clear monetary implications include:

  • Benefits: Per capita funding of benefits increases based upon the consumer price index. The current year guide for dental fees takes effect upon ratification (lowering member out of pocket costs). Members who do not receive benefits see their pay in lieu rise from 3% of compensation to 4%.

  • Sabbaticals: Sabbatical pay rates for members rise to 90% of salary (previously they were at 90% for a first sabbatical and 82.5% for subsequent sabbaticals). Leave pay rates for professional staff rise to 100% of salary except where the leave primarily benefits the worker (which rises to 75% of salary).

AASUA suggests that these gains amount to about an additional 1% of compensation on top of COLA. Additional compensation in non-salary form is also a feature of the MRFA and United Nurses of Alberta deals.

Language

There were a significant number of language changes which vary across categories of employees. Most of these have little relevance to AUFA members.

There is new language regarding employment equity (Article 23). The employer retains significant discretion in this language in how it will achieve equity goals, but this article includes a requirement to periodically disclose demographic data to the faculty association.

The AASUA agreement also requires the employer to conduct a review of non-gender based salary inequities and remedy statistically significant inequities. A previous settlement contained language that partially addressed gender-based pay inequities.

Analysis

The AAUSA agreement provides a cost-of-living increase of between 2.75% and 3.25%. This mirrors the developing provincial and PSE wage pattern (and the government mandate). This is the same deal that AU offered AUFA on February 28 after filed for mediation.

Additional compensation, in the form of benefits and sabbatical improvements, adds about an additional 1.0% of value. This additional compensation brings the AASUA agreement into the range of the United Nurses of Alberta and MRFA settlements. Did not offer any comparable increases in its February 28 offer.

AASUA also appears to have achieved some language improvements. Notably, the AASUA deal does not appear to contain any of the massive language rollbacks that AU is trying to push on AUFA members.

AASUA’s language improvements likely reflect that, in order to get AASUA to accept the government’s lousy wage-mandate, the U of A had to agree to some of AASUA other proposals. Time will tell if AU prefers this option to a work stoppage.

Jason Foster, Chair

AUFA Bargaining Committee

Bob Barnetson, Chair

Job Action Committee

Analysis of Mount Royal University Settlement

The Mount Royal Faculty Association recently ratified a new contract with MRU’s Board of Governors. This blog post provides an overview of the MRU settlement. Overall, this settlement follows the autumn AUPE government services pattern but with some additional monetary and language improvements.

Term and Money

This four-year deal has a term of July 1, 2020 to June 30, 2024. The cost-of-living adjustment (COLA) for all salaries and grids is as follows:

Jul 1, 2020: 0%

July 1, 2021: 0%

July 1, 2022: 0%

April 1, 2023: 1.25%

December 1, 2023: 1.5%

Additional increase December 1, 2023: 0.5% (not guaranteed)

The additional increase scheduled for December of 2023 is contingent upon the province achieving a real GDP for the 2023 calendar year that is “at or above 2.7% as of February 2024.” If this condition is met in February of 2024, MRU will retroactively apply an additional 0.5% COLA to December 1, 2023. If this condition is not met, then no additional increase will be forthcoming.

This means the MRFA settlement could see an (uncompounded) COLA increase of between 2.75% and 3.25% over its four-year term. Even with the addition of gain-sharing payments, this settlement will not maintain the purchasing power of MRFA salaries over time. For example, year-over-year inflation as of January 2022 was 5.1%. The MRFA settlement matches the COLA agreed to by AUPE for its government services bargaining unit. This appears to be the current secret financial mandate issued the government.

Extra Compensation

In addition to the COLA settlement, MRFA was able to negotiate some additional changes that have clear monetary implications.

  • Contract (i.e., short-term sessional) faculty saw changes to the structure of their grid effective May 2022. This change eliminates two categories (based on credentials). Contract faculty whose category was eliminated will “bump up” to a higher category and receive a 3.7% increase per instructional hour. All other contract faculty see a 0.7% increase. These increases are on top of the general COLA settlement.

  • MRFA made some gains at the table on benefits. Costs of the dental plan, which had been shared on a 50/50 (employer/worker) basis, and costs of the extended health plan, which had been shared on a 75/25 basis, now both move to 80/20 employer-worker split.

    This affects 93% of full-time faculty and 45% of contract faculty. The employer has also opened a window for more faculty to opt-in to the benefits plan.

It is difficult to ascertain the exact value of the changes in terms of overall faculty compensation due to (1) the variable number of contract faculty and (2) possible changes to benefit plan participation rates. MRFA suggests that overall impact is somewhere between 0.8% and 1.1%. That is top say, these gains amount to about an additional 1% of compensation on top of COLA.

Language

There were a significant number of language changes (about 57). Most of these have little relevance to AUFA members. You can read the full ratification package online here if you like.

Some changes that are of note include:

  • There are amendments to Articles 13.1.4 and 13.3.2 recognizing Indigenous knowledge in determining placements of new hires on the salary grid.

  • There is an entirely new Article (29) addressing Reconciliation goals.

  • Changes to Article 17 increase the number of full-year and part-year sabbatical leaves available to faculty. Unused sabbaticals roll-over to future years.

  • A joint workload committee has been struck to consider workload for faculty as well as promotion and tenure for less secure faculty. The outcome of this committee is not binding on either party, and as such, can be characterized as the mediator kicking these concerns down the road to a future round of bargaining in order to get a deal.

Analysis

The MRFA agreement provides a cost-of-living increase of between 2.75% and 3.25%. This mirrors the AUPE government deal (and the government mandate). This is the same deal that AU offered AUFA on Monday.

Additional compensation, in the form of benefit improvements and changes to the grids of precarious faculty, adds about an additional 1.0% of value. This additional compensation brings the MRFA agreement into the range of the United Nurses of Alberta settlement. It also broadly matches the Concordia University of Edmonton Faculty Association (CUEFA) settlement negotiated following its January strike.

MRFA also appears to have achieved some language improvements (as did CUEFA). Notably, the MRFA deal does not appear to contain any of the massive language rollbacks that AU is trying to push on AUFA members. These language improvements likely reflect that, in order to get MRFA to accept the government’s lousy wage-mandate, MRU had to agree to some of MRFA’s other proposals.

Jason Foster, Chair

AUFA Bargaining Team

Bob Barnetson, Chair

AUFA Job Action Committee

Faculty strike at Concordia enters second week

Last Thursday, 10 AUFA members joined in solidarity with striking faculty at Concordia University Edmonton (CUE), walking the picket line in blisteringly cold January weather. The CUE strike is unprecedented. It is the first post-secondary strike in Alberta’s history. This post provides some background and analysis on the strike, as well as identifying the implications for AUFA.

Background

Concordia is a private university located in Edmonton that focuses on providing high-quality, mostly undergraduate degrees. The university’s faculty association is small (~82 members) and includes faculty members, professional librarians, laboratory instructors, and field placement coordinators. Concordia also employs a large number of temporary sessional instructors who are not members of Concordia University Edmonton Faculty Association (CUEFA).

Concordia’s financial situation is strong. Its 2020/21 expenditures were $35.3 million and it generated an operating surplus of $11.5m (~33%). The previous year, its operating surplus was $7.8m. Most of the surpluses come from tuition revenue (enrollment and tuition are increasing). Overall, tuition and fees account for 64.3% of total university revenue.

At the end of fiscal year 2020/21, Concordia had $39.8m in the bank. Rather than reinvest some of that surplus to compensate chronically underpaid teaching staff, the university instead used $1.75m to buy the historic Magrath Mansion on Ada Blvd. University administration insists that the residence will serve as a campus, but it’s presently zoned as residential so it can’t be used that way. The building is also more than a century old, is architecturally unsuited for university use, and requires significant and ongoing financial resources just to maintain it.

Bargaining to Date

CUEFA has been bargaining for a new contract since early 2021. Concordia faculty have among the lowest salaries in Canada, and labour under among the heaviest teaching loads in Canada (~8 courses per year). Not surprisingly, then, fair and reasonable salary improvements, as well as a workload reduction remain top issues at bargaining.

The nexus between salary and workload is especially salient, since Concordia’s administration is demanding ever greater faculty research output in an effort to enhance the institution’s research reputation. Concordia’s goal is fine. But it can’t do that on the backs of relatively low-waged and overworked staff. The parties are also negotiating intellectual property provisions.

During bargaining, Concordia proposed new disciplinary language which appears to mean that university administrators could terminate faculty without just cause. No other faculty association in Canada has disciplinary language that gives the employer so much latitude, in part because workers know an employer will abuse such discretion. It’s also just plain unfair, and violates basic principles of any collegial workplace.

In November, CUEFA took a strike vote. Ninety-five percent of members voted and 90% of them voted in favour of a strike. Subsequently, the employer and the union were able to make some progress on faculty workload issues (but not for other members).

Concordia offered to withdraw its disciplinary proposal if CUEFA agrees to sign over its members’ intellectual property to the employer. This proposal suggests Concordia’s disciplinary language is simply an effort by the employer to generate some bargaining leverage. After the first week of the strike, Concordia withdrew this just-cause proposal.

One social media report suggests Concordia was offering:

2021/22: 0%

2022/23: 0%

2023/24: 0.5%

2024/25: 1.0%

2025/26: 1.5%

For context, inflation in Alberta in 2021 was 4.3%. Concordia declined CUEFA offers in mediation and the faculty began their strike on January 4.

Concordia not only has the capacity to pay its faculty a fair wage, but, as a private institution, it is not subject to the provincial government’s secret bargaining mandates that limit what other PSEs can agree to. Essentially, this strike is entirely the making of Concordia’s Board and president. This means that Concordia can resolve this strike at any time by returning to the bargaining table (which they have so far refused to do).

Strike Impact

One way to think about a strike is as an effort by workers to attach costs to an employer’s behaviour. If the costs are high enough, the employer will behave differently and, presumably, a mutually acceptable collective agreement will be negotiated. The CUEFA strike has (so far) generated the following costs for Concordia:

  • Operational: All classes are cancelled, including those taught by non-CUEFA employees (see below).

  • Financial: Concordia has deferred tuition deadlines and is at risk of losing an entire semester of tuition.

  • Reputational: Concordia has received negative media stories and social media coverage that contrast its decision to buy a literal mansion with its decision to grind faculty wages. This bad press jeopardizes Concordia’s reputation as a good employer and a reliable provider of education.

It is unclear what Concordia’s strategy is beyond trying to starve out to CUEFA. University administrators may be hoping that CUEFA will call off its strike before Concordia loses the semester and a large portion of its revenue. It may also be that Concordia does not have much of a strategy; it was reportedly taken aback that faculty were prepared to strike.

Impact on Sessionals

A largely unreported aspect of the strike is that Concordia’s decision to cancel classes has left its large complement of non-unionized sessional instructors in the lurch. These instructors, highly qualified and dedicated all, are not being allowed to teach and are not being paid even though they are not on strike.

The sessionals have few options and none of them are good. They may be able to sue for wrongful dismissal, but that is expensive, slow, and likely means they will never work at Concordia again. Alternately, they can sit tight and hope for a quick resolution. Either way, they’re facing deeply unfair financial hardships.

Settlement Prospects

Bargaining resumed after the first week of the strike. Concordia reportedly dropped its demand to fire faculty for no reason at all on the first day of renewed bargaining. Issues remaining in dispute are workloads for CUEFA members other than professors, intellectual property, and salaries.

CUEFA is reporting that its wage demands could be met with approximately $350,000 in additional funding (or, if you prefer, approximately 0.18 mansions). Concordia forcing a strike and risking its reputation over 3% of its annual surplus demonstrates astoundingly bad judgment.

One impediment to a settlement may be government pressure on Concordia to not settle for more than the government’s PSE mandate (which presently appears to mirror the AUPE government settlement). Ego may also be an issue: such a settlement would be a big step-down by Concordia bosses, including its president (and mansion enthusiast) Tim Loreman.

Implications for AUFA

The CUEFA strike has a couple of lessons for AUFA:

  • Pressure works, but incrementally. CUEFA made workload gains only after it took a strike vote. CUEFA forced Concordia to drop its discipline language only after striking. Essentially, each time CUEFA has upped the pressure, the employer has moved.

  • You can’t bluff. You have to be prepared to carry out your threats. If you won’t strike, you are stuck accepting whatever rollbacks the employer wants to impose. And the employer won’t take you seriously next time if you get caught bluffing.

  • Effective strikes are possible, even in a pandemic. CUEFA has fully disrupted Concordia’s operations and choked off Concordia’s main source of revenue.

  • Solidarity helps. Flying and digital pickets help boost strikers’ morale and amplify their message. This intensifies the pressure on the employer to bargain. CUEFA has seen strong support from other unions, faculty associations, and students.

  • Pressure takes time to work. It took a week of financial and reputational pressure for Concordia to drop its disciplinary demands. Having access to the CAUT strike fund allows CUEFA members the time to let the pressure work.

  • Employers often seek outcomes that they don’t objectively need. Concordia is flush with cash and doesn’t need wage freezes. So why did it trigger a strike? Common reasons include the employer wanting to knock workers down a peg, undermine growing worker power, appease someone powerful, and to protect bosses’ egos. Employers can also blunder into strikes by under-estimating worker resolve.

  • Employers don’t care about students (or other workers). Concordia’s decision to force a strike is harming students and sessionals. These predictable spillover effects are an unfortunate reality of work stoppages. It isn’t up to workers to prevent these harms—only the employer can do that.

  • Nonetheless, students and workers are supportive of strikes. Most have more in common with the strikers than they do with the bosses. They understand the need for fair wages and working conditions. And they understand that striking is how workers achieve those goals.

AUFA will again be joining CUEFA on the picket line on Thursday afternoon, from 1-3. If you’d like to come out, please contact me at barnetso@athabascau.ca .

You can also send CUE president and mansion enthusiast Tim Loreman and email using this CAUT mailer. So far, Loreman has received nearly 1200 emails.

Bob Barnetson, Chair

Job Action Committee

Post-Secondary Salary Trends in Athabasca

Last week, the AUFA executive appointed the members of the 2020 AUFA bargaining team. The team presently includes Alexa DeGagne, Jason Foster, Serena Henderson, Bangaley Kaba, and Eric Strikwerda (Chair). We will be joined by a support member from the office staff.

Preparation for bargaining will begin soon with a structured consultation with the membership. As a prelude to this consultation, it may be useful to review some of the government data about salary settlements in the post-secondary sector. This data allows us to assess the effectiveness of our bargaining efforts. When compared to inflation, we can also track the purchasing power of our salaries over time.

Table 1 outlines settlements by the three bargaining units at Athabasca between 2005 and 2018. The Alberta Union of Provincial Employees (AUPE) represents support staff, and the Canadian Union of Public employees (CUPE) represents tutors and academic experts. All values are expressed as uncompounded percentage increases.

Inflation data is Statistic Canada’s Consumer Price Index for Alberta as provided by AUPE staff. The annual inflation was calculated by averaging monthly year-over-year (July to June) changes to create a reasonable proxy for annual inflation.

Table 1: Athabasca settlements (%) over time versus inflation, 2005 to 2018.

AUFA cost-of-living adjustments appear to have kept our salaries even with inflation, but when you compound COLA and inflation we find our salaries increased by approximately 38% while inflation increased approximately 51%.

It is also notable that since 2013, AUFA cost-of-living-adjustments (+5.75%) have lagged inflation (+10.6%). That is to say, since 2013, the employer has succeeded in grinding down AUFA members’ salaries through increases that have lagged behind inflation. All AU employee groups took another wage freeze in 2019 while inflation is running about 1.3% so far this year.

This pattern is also evident when we examine settlement patterns among faculty associations at Alberta’s four Comprehensive Academic Research Universities (CARUs). While AUFA has done well in comparison to most CARUs, since 2013 all CARUs are seeing wage increases lag behind inflation.

Table 2: University faculty settlements over time, 2005 to 2018

Table 2: University faculty settlements over time, 2005 to 2018

One of the factors affecting this pattern has been the traditional reliance on arbitration to break bargaining impasse. Arbitrators tend to establish wages with reference to other, known settlements among comparator institutions. The first few settlements in a sector often “set” the pattern. In this dynamic, a “bad” settlement by one institution would often limit the settlement that other associations could realistically expect to get.

Legislative change in 2017 means that arbitration is no longer the de facto means by which a bargaining impasse between CARUs and faculty associations is broken. While institutions will continue to cooperate in order to hold down wage settlements (often at the behest of government), faculty associations are no longer automatically constrained by the settlements at other institutions. Instead, faculty can strike in an attempt to increase their wage settlement.

As AUFA’s analysis of AU’s financial statements previously demonstrated, AU could have afforded to give all employee groups a raise last year. While it is unclear what (if any) reduction in government operating grants is planned for this year, AU is likely to continue to have a healthy operating surplus and a reasonable accumulated surplus.

Another factor that may be relevant going forward is whether the government chooses to legislate a wage freeze or wage rollback, either in the October 2019 or Spring 2020 budget. It is unclear whether the government will take such action and whether such legislation would survive a constitutional challenge.

Eric Strikwerda

Bargaining Chair